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CONTRACT LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY
The Law of Contract. By H. Collins. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson,
1986.
Reviewed by lain Ramsay.*
What a thing does is only one of the things that it means, but everything that
it means is something else that it does....
Arthur Leff
During the past decade, there has been a remarkable resurgence
of theoretical scholarship attempting to explain and justify the law of
contract.2 The new system builders have assiduously attempted to provide
a variety of intellectual scaffoldings for contract similar to earlier attempts
in the law of torts.3 The concept of promise, efficiency, reasonable reliance,
and the new paternalism have all been proffered as explanations and
justifications for the possible patterns of reasoning in appellate decisions.4
In addition, the relational perspective has drawn attention to the im-
portance and limits of contract as an organizational framework for a
vast number of business and social relations. 5 Several areas of law are
being reconceptualized through the lens of contractual analysis; 6 it seems
@ Copyright, 1986, lain Ramsay.
* Faculty of Law, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, Visiting Professor at Osgoode Hall
Law School 1986-87. Thanks to Allan Hutchinson and Toni Williams for comments on earlier
drafts.
I A. Leff, "Law and" (1978) 87 Yale LJ. 989.
2 See infra, note 4 for some recent examples; for an excellent summary of the role of theory
in contract law, see M. Bayles, "The Purpose of Contract Law" (1983) 17 Val. U.L. Rev. 613.
3 See, in relation to tort law, L England, "System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modem
American Tort Theory" (1980) 9 J. Leg. Stud. 27.
4 C. Fried, Contract as Promise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Undiversity Press, 1981); A.
Kronman & R. Posner, The Economics of Contract Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1979); R. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law, 2d ed. (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown) c. 4 at 65; P. Atiyah, "Contracts
Promises and the Law of Obligations" (1978) 94 L.Q. Rev. 193; G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974); D. Kennedy, "Distributive and Paternalist Motives
in Contract and Tort Law with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power" (1982) 41 Maryland L. Rev. 563 and the early article by Fuller and Perdue, "The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages" (1936) 46 Yale LJ. 52.
5 0. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (New York: Free Press, 1979); Alchian and Demsetz,
"Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organisation" (1972) 62 Am. Ec. Rev. 777. See
also the work of Ian R. Macneil; for example, The New Social Contract (New Haven, 1980) and
the symposium on Macaulay's work in (1985) Wisc. L. Rev. 461.
6 For example, the area of regulatory enforcement (see infra, note 89) and corporate law.
For critiques of these forms of analysis in these areas, see G. Winter, "Bartering Rationality" (1985)
19 L. and Soc'y Rev. 219 and V. Brudney, "Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and The Rhetoric
of Contract" (1985) 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1403.
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at times that the world of human relations would be completely based
on voluntary exchange - but for transaction costs. Contract appears
indeed to have been resurrected as living law, metaphor, and myth.
7
What do these developments signify? How do we compare and evaluate
competing explanations and justifications? What are the implications of
these theories for legal teaching and research? Do these academic flurries
reflect broader social concerns or dissatisfaction with contract law and
practice?
These issues may be approached initially through an analysis of
Hugh Collins's provocative and elegantly written monograph, The Law
of Contract.8 This book represents a significant advance in English
contracts scholarship. It rejects the picture of contract law as an
autonomous area of legal argument, separate from issues of moral, social,
and political value. On the contrary, arguments in contract law are
inextricably intertwined with those values. 9 Contract law is, in Collins's
view, a contested concept it speaks with different voices.10 Consequently,
contract law reasoning is "controversial, ... cannot produce definitive
answers to disputes by reference to authority, and its conclusions are
constantly challenged and restated in the light of experience and changing
moral and political values."'1 I Analysis of contract law reveals competing
interpretations of the nature of social justice and social interaction in
society.
It is important to understand Collins's message. It is not that moral
and political issues are an interesting addition to traditional legal reasoning
as evidenced in texts such as Cheshire and Fifoot, 2 Anson, 3 or Wad-
dams.14 Rather, it is that arguments concerning the scope of promissory
estoppel or the protection of pre-contractual reliance are inherently ethical
and political in nature. The issues cannot be adequately understood except
in terms of competing and often contradictory values. This concept of
law, as presented by Collins, reflects generally the approach of Ronald
7 Gilmore, supra, note 4.
8 H. Collins, The Law of Contract (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986).
9 Ibid at x.
10 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
11 Collins, supra, note 9.
12 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, Law of Contract, I 1 th ed. (London and Toronto: Butterworths,
1986).
13 Anson's Law of Contract, 26th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
14 S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 2d ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1984).
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Dworkin 5 and more specifically Roberto Unger's vision of contract law
as competing principle and counterprinciple.6 This vision in turn draws
on Kessler and Gilmore's seminal work on contract as a metaphor for
competing political visions of freedom and social control.
17
The concept of contract law as a coherent and relatively discrete
set of legal principles, albeit peppered with anomalies and exceptions,
still retains a powerful hold over the English and Canadian academy
and textbook. The idea that contract law is political is regarded by many
scholars as perhaps worthy of mention in an introductory lecture but
extraneous to the analysis of specific doctrines. 8 By challenging these
cherished assumptions, Collins's work has evoked a relatively sceptical
and even vitriolic response in 61ite English reviews. 19 But make no mistake,
contract scholarship is part of the battle over the future of legal scholarship
and teaching, issues clearly of contemporary relevance in both Canada
and the U.K.20 Although I shall disagree with several of Collins's
arguments, he is absolutely right in locating debate in contract scholarship
at the political and moral level.
Collins develops two interpretive models to outline competing visions
of contract law, describing them as the 'facilitative' and the 'regulatory'
models. The former is associated with the liberal ideals of allowing
individuals to pursue voluntary choices in the marketplace; its fulcrum
is the concept of voluntary consent. The latter represents communitarian
values associated with the growth of the welfare state; these include
assistance to the weak and vulnerable, fairness, altruism, and redistri-
15 Compare, for example, Collins, supra, note 8 at xi with R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986) at 11. "[L]aw is our most structured and revealing social institution.
If we understand the nature of our legal argument better, we know better what kind of people
we are."
16 Collins acknowledges specifically this debt noting that Unger's "influence upon the text
... is pervasive." For example, his use of "relationships of dependency" seems to be drawn from
Unger. See R Unger, Law in Modern Society (New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1976). For
Unger's vision of contract law, see "The Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1983) 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 563.
17 F. Kessler & G. Gilmore, Contracts Cases and Materials, 2d ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1970).
This work appears to have had significant influence on much of the work of the Critical Legal
Studies movement in relation to contract. Duncan Kennedy dedicates "Legal Formality" (1973)
2 J. Leg. Stud. 351 to Kessler and indicates at various points in his work a debt to Kessler. Kessler,
a German emigrd, must undoubtedly have been influenced by Weber's work on contract and power.
Kessler may thus be seen as part of an intellectual chain connecting the work and concerns of
one of the major European grand theorists with the modem Critical Legal Studies movement
18 See, ag., Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, supra, note 12 at c. 2
19 F. Reynolds, (1986) 102 L. Q. Rev. 628 (scepticism); A. Weir, (1986) 46 Cam. LJ. 503
(vitriol).
20 See, ag., Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council, Law and Learning (Chair H.W. Arthurs) (1983).
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bution.2 As part of this welfare state, contract law jettisons the concept
of voluntary consent as the sole test of contractual responsibility. Courts
ensure the substantive fairness of market outcomes by imposing an ideal
conception of market relations where there appears to be significant
unfairness in market outcome. He argues that this latter model better
explains the modem law of contract, is more in line with the inter-
dependence of modem business relationships, and has greater moral
force.22 In contrast, the ideals underlying the facilitative model - liberty,
equality, and reciprocity - have, in his view, long ago lost their moral
force and explanatory power.
The regulatory model, according to Collins, also better explains the
form of the modem law.23 Within the classical facilitative model, the
law was a set of clear judicial rules, separate from politics and morality
and applied logically by an impartial judiciary. This served the purposes
of providing clear boundaries for private action, a sharp distinction
between the public and private realm, and political legitimacy for the
judiciary. In contrast, the modem law exhibits two contrasting devel-
opments. First, there has been an unwillingness on the part of society
to accept the distributive outcomes of the facilitative model. This has
resulted in legislative regulation of a variety of relationships (for example,
consumer, labour, insurance, and so on). Second, judges have balked
at the injustice flowing from the logical application of rules and have
manipulated doctrines to achieve substantive justice. Ultimately, certain
judges have been willing to articulate new open-textured substantive
principles, such as the doctrine of inequality of bargaining power. These
developments require the judiciary to balance competing ethical values.
In consequence, the discourse of contract law cannot be separated from
moral and ethical discourse and there has been a movement from formal
to substantive rationality.
Broad standards applied by the judiciary are, however, a limited
tool for the detailed regulation necessary in modem life. The second
development is, therefore, the growth of bureaucratic regulation that
supplants judicial regulation of contract fairness. Collins senses dangers
in this trend since bureaucratic regulation raises the danger of bureaucratic
domination and may unnecessarily constrict the efficiency of the market.
Collins's response is corporatism, which is intended to steer a middle
course between unbridled laissez-faire and bureaucratic domination.24
21 Collins, supra, note 8 at 1.
22 Ibid at 2.
23 Ibid at 15-21.
24 IbId at 203-209.
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Codes of practice enforced by private groups in the shadow of government
review become a primary method of implementing regulation, and Collins
points to modern consumer protection measures as an example of
corporatism. This development in turn obliterates the clear distinction
in the classical model between public regulation and private action and
breaks down the traditional boundaries of private and public law.
Collins's work is both an explanation and justification for a particular
vision of contract law in modern society. The argument of the book
would have been clearer if he had separated more sharply normative
arguments from causal and functional explanations. At one level, he treats
appellate contract argument as a rhetorical metaphor for competing
visions of society; one based on the market values of consent and risk
taking and the other drawing on the values of trust, confidence, and
benevolent paternalism. At this level, the argument is both expressive
and idealist - contract law creates "the detailed ideal of social justice
by which people judge their behaviour,"25 and contractual reasoning is
part of a continuing conversation in which we attempt to develop some
sense of ourselves and society.
Given the analogy of continuous dialogue, why should we accept
his regulatory vision of contract? There is little sustained normative
argument on this topic throughout the book. Indeed, the further I proceeded
the more I was confronted either with assertions that paternalism was
the better explanation for a doctrine26 or that a judicial approach was
correct.27 The argument often comes close to a type of evolutionary
functionalism similar to that found in Atiyah's Rise and Fall of Freedom
of Contract,28 society has changed, ergo the law must change to meet
society's needs. This causal explanation also underlies the advent of
corporatism, which appears to have closed out the debate between
competing visions by suggesting that society is now based on consensus
rather than conflict. I doubt that Collins would wish to commit himself
to this position given his assumption that contract discourse cannot avoid
"open-ended disputes about the basic terms of social life, disputes that
people call ideological, philosophical, or visionary."29 It would have been
better, perhaps, if he had avoided the temptation to have a happy ending
and recognised that contract is a vast continuum of principle and
counterprinciple. 30
25 Ibid at 6-7.
26 Ibid at 122.
27 Ibid at 133.
28 p. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
29 Unger, supra, note 16 at 564.
30 Kessler & Gilmore, supra, note 17 at 2.
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Having disposed of these methodological issues, I wish to pursue
three closely related, but distinct, arguments in Collins's text:
(1) The contract failure hypothesis: In contemporary society, voluntary
exchange in the market may no longer lead to mutually beneficial
results for the contracting parties.
(2) The interdependence thesis- Market relationships have become more
complex, so that contracts are no longer exercises in individual risk
taking but rather cooperative ventures.
(3) The institutional argument- Corporatism is the appropriate model for
harnessing the benefits of both private markets and public regulation.
The relationship between voluntary market exchange - the insti-
tution of freedom of contract - and power and domination in society
has long been a central theme to students of law in modem society.
Weber's work, for instance, was animated by a deep concern that freedom
of contract might reinforce the power of existing holders of property
rights to coerce individuals in both the labour and consumer markets.
Kessler's seminal writings on contract,31 influenced both by Weber and
the Frankfurt School's vision of a coming authoritarianism,32 described
how contract might be used to build industrial empires. Collins follows
the path of these writers and appears often to be merely amplifying
Weber's famous passage on freedom of contract. Given its enormous
influence, it is worthwhile setting it out fully:
The development of legally regulated relationships toward contractual association
and of the law itself toward freedom of contract, especially toward a system of
free disposition within the framework of regulated legal-type transactions, is usually
regarded as signifying a decrease of constraint and an increase of individual
freedom .... [T]he formal empowerment to set the content of contracts in acordance
with one's desires and independently of all official form patterns, in and of itself
by no means makes sure that these formal possibilities will in fact be available
to all and everyone. Such availability is prevented above all by the differences in
the distribution of property as guaranteed by law.. . . [Emphasis added.]
It is necessary to emphasize strongly this aspect of the state of affairs in
order not to fall into the widely current error that that type of decentralization
of the lawmaking process which is embodied in this modem form of the
schematically delimited autonomy of the parties' legal transactions is identical
with a decrease of the degree of coercion exercised within a legal community
as compared with other communities, for instance, one organized along socialist
lines....
A legal order which contains ever so few mandatory and prohibitory norms
and ever so many 'freedoms' and 'empowerments' can nonetheless in its practical
31 See, ag., F. Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract"
(1943) 43 Col. L. Rev. 629.
32 See the discussion of Kessler's work in G. Priest, "The Invention of Enterprise Liability:
A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law" (1985) 15 J. Leg. Stud.
461.
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effects facilitate a quantitative and qualitative increase not only of coercion in
general but quite specifically of authoritarian coercion.
33
Weber's arguments have sometimes been used in conjunction with
studies of bureaucracy to produce images of a modernity - dominated
by large private and public bureaucracies whose impersonal authori-
tarianism has replaced the paternalist and hierarchical structures of pre-
industrial society and where freedom of contract provides its ideological
underpinning. At times, Collins paints with this broad brush and ca-
tegorises consumers as being in "a relation of dependence" 34 to producers.
Yet in other passages, he draws attention to the importance of markets
as a valuable means of providing goods and services.
If the concept of power in contractual relations is to be given some
meaningful content and analytical bite, sharper concepts than "relation
of dependence" must be provided. This issue is of both theoretical and
practical importance. The growth of unconscionability and inequality of
bargaining power as a mainspring for both judicial and legislative
regulation of the marketplace has been accompanied by a surprising
lack of precision as to their meaning or the identity of an unconscionable
transaction. 35 Only by prising open the assumptions and objectives
underlying voluntary market exchange is it possible to answer such
questions.
A voluntary market exchange might be judged unfair either by
reference to market values or wider social objectives. A market-based
definition of unfairness could be identified initially by reference to those
conditions that prevent an individual making a rational and voluntary
choice in a market. This might occur through monopoly (either market
wide or situational - "the only tug in the storm"),36 information failures
(for example, misrepresentation) or, what Eisenberg has dubbed, "trans-
actional incapacity" 37 (caused by high pressure sales techniques). These
are either failures in the process of contracting or in the market structure.
The remedy for these failures might be through competition policy or
the provision of greater information (for example, through truth in lending,
33 M. Weber, Law in Economy and Society, ed. by M. Rheinstein (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1966) at 188-89
34 Collins, supra, note 8 at 120-22.
35 The literature on unconscionability is vast. Useful explorations of its meaning and limits
may be found in Eisenberg, "The Bargain Principle and its Limits" (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 741;
Kennedy, supra note 4; MJ. Trebilcock, "An Economic Approach to the Doctrine of Uncons-
cionability" in J. Swan & B. Reiter, eds, Studies in Contract Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980)
379; R. Hasson, "Unconscionability and Good Faith in the New Sales Act - Confessions of a
Doubting Thomas" (1979) 4 Can. Bus. LJ, 383.
36 Trebilcock, ibid at 392-96.
37 Eisenberg, supra, note 35 at 763.
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cooling off periods, and so on). The goal is, therefore, to correct the
failures so that market processes might more closely approximate a
situation where voluntary exchanges will result in Pareto improvements
and, ultimately, Pareto optimality; that is, a situation where no further
mutually beneficial transactions will occur. There are, however, a vast
number of Pareto optimal outcomes dependent on the particular dis-
tribution of property rights and Collins is clearly concerned with the
distributive fairness of market outcomes. Unfairness is identified, therefore,
with the existing distribution of property rights and the potential disparity
in the resources and talents available to individuals to make advantageous
bargains. These sentiments echo Weber's critique and have long been
an argument both for state regulation of property rights and the redis-
tribution of wealth.38 There is, however, controversy among liberals over
the comparative effectiveness and fairness of contract law as a redis-
tributive mechanism compared with redistribution through the taxation
and social security system.39
A more subtle insinuation of distributive issues is introduced by
Anthony Kronman.40 He argues that it is impossible to avoid distributive
judgments in establishing the ground rules for voluntary exchange. Thus,
we must determine such difficult questions as when it is legitimate to
permit one party with superior information to take advantage of it in
the marketplace. Since the concept of voluntariness helps us little in
this endeavour, the thin end of this distributive wedge creates problems
for theorists who wish to rationalise contract purely in terms of private
autonomy and freedom. Collins exploits the elastic notion of voluntariness
to argue that it ought no longer to be the touchstone of contractual
responsibility. It is equally plausible, however, to maintain voluntariness
and to adopt something akin to the Rawlsian difference principle in order
to determine the distribution of initial property rights in market infor-
mation.41 That we cannot avoid distributive judgements does not entail
the rejection of voluntariness.
Kronman's article does draw attention to the fact that contract law
functions within certain ground rules established by society. Much of
consumer protection legislation is intended to change the ground rules,
for example, by preventing sellers from taking advantage of superior
information. These markets clearly may still be efficient within this
38 j Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971) at 65-
75.
39 A. Kronman, "Contract Law and Distributive Justice" (1980) 89 Yale LJ. 472.
40 Ibid
41 Kronman adopts this principle but mistakenly calls it a Paretian principle.
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particular distributive framework. Critics of consumer protection leg-
islation cannot argue, therefore, that this legislation results in inefficiencies.
It is primarily the inherently political distributive issue that is at stake.
Collins also appears to reject a further assumption in the economic
market model - that individuals are the best judges of their own interests.
Paternalism is an important justification for regulating contract relations.
In summary, Collins's broad claims of exploitation and relations of
dependency may be collapsed into three theories - market failure,
distributive goals, and paternalism.42 Collins often refers to the consumer
marketplace as an arena of producer domination and to consumer
transactions as "relations of dependence." Consequently, it is useful to
test these theories in the context of this market. The dependence image
of the lone consumer pitted against the large organization gains credence
from a conceptualization of contract as an individual transaction. How-
ever, consumer contracts are primarily mass-produced products whose
terms are determined by the aggregate of market forces rather than
individual bargaining.43 Thus, a finding of market failure based on
information failure will require analysis of conditions in a particular
market.44 It is, for example, not necessary for all consumers to be informed
or to read the terms of contracts for a market to work relatively
competitively.45 Provided a certain proportion do so at the margin, business
may respond to the preferences of this group.
During the 1960s and 70s, there was a broad sentiment that business
exploited consumers through the use of carefully limited warranties and
exception clauses. However, many argue that contemporary markets are
more competitive and consumers better informed.46 The current prolif-
eration of automobile warranties might, for example, be contrasted with
the apparently dismal warranty coverage shown in the seminal case of
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors.47 I do not wish to argue that consumer
markets are perfect. However, overarching arguments based on exploi-
tation or "relations of dependency," not only lack coherence as explanatory
theories, but are a poor substitute for careful analysis of conditions in
particular markets. There are also important institutional implications
in changing the focus from the individual transaction to the market
42 See generally Kennedy, supra, note 4.
43 A. Leff, "Contract as Thing" (1970) 19 Am. U.L. Rev. 131.
44 See generally A. Schwartz & L. Wilde, "Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information" (1979) 127 U. Pan. L. Rev. 630.
45 Ibid
46 This is implicit in the work of Priest, "A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty"
(1981) 90 Yale LJ. 1297.
47 (1960), 32 NJ. 358, 161 A. 2d 69.
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conditions. Courts are unlikely to be well suited to collect and assess
systematic information on market conditions.48 Nor will they be able
to order appropriate remedial action, such as plain language legislation
or greater consumer information. These factors suggest that much of
the continued focus on judicial control of standard-form consumer
contracts is misguided. While there may always be a residual role for
judicial adjudication of pathological cases, they ought not to play a major
regulatory role.
Are the terms of standard consumer transactions likely to be
distributively unfair? A running theme in consumer protection has
concerned the protection of lower income consumers, particularly in
housing, rental, and credit markets. I am sceptical about the effectiveness
of judge-made contract law as a redistributive mechanism. The insti-
tutional limitations of courts and the strong incentive of regulated parties
to avoid the bite of judicial action suggest that it is unlikely to have
a major distributive impact.49 Experience of judicial price control of
interest rates indicates that it is, at best, likely to be a poor substitute
for more systematic attempts to address the problems of low income
consumers. For example, the extortionate credit bargain provisions of
the British Consumer Credit Act 197450 are of little significance in the
regulation of the price terms of credit transactions.5' Further, the history
of the unconscionability section of the American Uniform Commercial
Code shows that it has stimulated far greater academic commentary than
social change.52
Paternalism overrides individual preferences by substituting the
paternalist's judgment for that of the individual protected. It may often
be difficult to distinguish those situations where paternalistic measures
are justified by reference to an individual's real preferences and those
where individual preferences are overruled.5 3 The rediscovery of pat-
ernalism in the common law of contract has been primarily a consequence
of economic analysis, whose sharp individualistic premises could notjustify
48 See Trebilcock, supra, note 35 at 391 and 396-406; Hasson, supra, note 35.
49 Many writers are sceptical of the impact of private law judicial decision making. See Epstein,
"The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules" (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1717 at 1744-51;
Unger, supra, note 15 at 581; and Cranston, "What do Courts do?" (1985) Civ. Just. Q. 123.
50 Consumer Credit Act 1974 (U.K.), c. 39, ss 147-49.
51 The Office of Fair Trading in the U.K. is unable to give guidelines on the meaning of
ss 147-149 since each case must depend on "all the facts."
52 W.C. Whitford, "Structuring Consumer Protection Legislation to Maximise Effectiveness"
(1981) Wisc. L. Rev. 1018.
53 J.Kleinig, Paternalism(Totowa, NJ.:Rowman and Allanheld, 1983) and I. Ramsay, Rationales
for Intervention in the Consumer Marketplace (London: Office of Fair Trading (U.K.), Occasional
Paper, 1984) at 56-57.
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anomalies such as the penalty rules or even non-disclaimable warranties.5 4
Paternalism seemed the only pigeon- hole available. In such a climate,
the issue becomes when paternalism is a useful justification for striking
down a contract. Two contrasting decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada suggest the need for thinking through this issue. In Clarke v.
Thermidaire,ss a freely negotiated liquidated damages clause was struck
down because the consequences of enforcement seemed, with judicial
hindsight, to be too unfair. Chief Justice Laskin's justification was pure
paternalism: the courts had a dispensing power to protect a contracting
party against her own mistakes 6 In contrast, the Court in Dyckv. Manitoba
Snowmobile Association Inc. exhibited little paternalistic concern for a
young person who hastily signed a waiver before entering a snowmobile
race in which he was severely injured; he had made a free choice to
accept the terms and must be bound by the limitation of liability. 7 Which
consumer contract terms should be struck down on paternalistic grounds
- exclusion clauses, limitations of liability for negligently caused personal
injury, acceleration clauses? These are clearly political questions and,
again, raise the issue of the legitimacy of judicial regulation. It may
be true, as Duncan Kennedy claims, that paternalism reflects an "element
of real nobility" 58 when used to strike down consumer contracts "designed
to perpetuate the exploitation of the poorest class of buyers on credit."59
However, the limitations of courts in achieving any systematic redis-
tributive impact on consumer markets suggests a symbolic, rather than
substantive, impact.
Is there more to contract power than these efficiency, distributive,
and paternalist arguments? A diverse body of recent work by economists
and organisational theorists suggests that large private bureaucracies -
although ultimately disciplined by the capital and consumer markets -
retain significant discretionary power over how, when, and where to
market products and services.60 There is rarely one obvious strategy to
maximise profits. Charles Lindblom, for example, argues that this
phenomenon poses "an increasingly serious threat to popular control"
through the market system.61 He concludes:
54 Kronman & Posner, supra, note 4 at 253-61.
55 (1974), [1976] 1 SCR. 319.
56 Ibid at 330-31.
57 Dyck v. Manitoba Snowmobile Association Inc (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 589.
58 D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1685 at 1777.
59 lbid
60 E. Herrman, Corporate Power, Corporate Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981); C. Stone, Where the Law Ends (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).
61 C. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1976) at 155.
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A textbook "theoretical" dismissal of the importance of the phenomenon of
corporate discretion on delegated decisions takes roughly this form. Consumer
control will drive each firm to find the one correct maximum profit decision of
all delegated issues. If consumer control fails to do so, it is because of monopoly;
and at that point the discussion turns back again to the familiar problems of
monopoly. The fact is, however, that even under highly competitive conditions,
corporate executives cannot... unerringly find one correct solution to their complex
problems. Since they cannot, they have to exercise discretion. Even in principle
there is no one least-cost solution to a complex problem.
62
This concept of power is not captured by traditional market failures
and clearly merits further investigation.
In summary, I offer two conclusions. First, Collins's broad claims
on contract power need to be reduced to more specific rationales -
efficiency, redistribution, and paternalism - if they are to have explan-
atory bite or provide a coherent framework for regulation. Second,judicial
decisions may be a poor second best in addressing problems of contract
power in mass markets.
A major argument of Collins's work is the greater degree of
interdependence in contemporary market relations, resulting in greater
reliance between firms and the consequent need for doctrine to adjust
to these changes. Business transactions are no longer high risk gambles
but rather cooperative ventures.63 This "new spirit of commercial law,"64
which some scholars see reflected in various parts of the American Uniform
Commercial Code65 and the growth of reliance-based doctrines, does gain
some support from recent judicial rhetoric.66 Markets have indeed become
more complex through product differentiation, internationalisation, and
so on. The complex web of relationships surrounding the automobile
industry mean that no western government may allow a major company
to declare bankruptcy.67 It is, however, necessary to separate out different
markets rather than to accept a rather overarching interdependence thesis.
Certain markets involve no long-term relationships between parties,
whereas others, like requirements contracts, may do so. In some contracts,
each party may be effectively locked in through a major capital investment
62 Ibid
63 Collins, supra, note 8 at c. 10.
64 Alcoa v. Essex Group Ina (1980), 499 F. Supp. 53, Teitelbaum J. [hereinafter Alcoa]
65 J. Feinman, "Critical Approaches to Contract Law" (1982-83) 30 UCLA L. Rev. 829
at 836-37.
66 Alcoa, supra, note 64; but note the limits of interdependence when a union attempted to
prevent U.S. Steel moving out of a company town, basing its action on promissory estoppel. See
Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp. (1980) 631 F. 2d. 1264 (6th Cir.).
67 R. Reich, "Bailout: A Comparative Study of Law and Industrial Structure" (1985) 2 Yale
J. Reg. 163.
[VOL. 24 No. 2
Book Review
in the particular transaction.68 In such transactions, it will be in both
parties' rational self-interest to cooperate during performance and to plan
against opportunism. Co-operation thus arises, not from altruistic concern
or "a communitarian ideal of concern for the interests of others," 69 but
from more traditional self-interested reasons.
One of the most interesting developments in contracts scholarship
has been the investigation of private ordering and institutions alternative
to the state that might reduce uncertainty and conflict in contractual
relationships.70 Macneil's work on relational contracts,71 Williamson's
analysis of the different forms of contractual governance, 72 and Macaulay's
empirical studies of manufacturing firms and the automobile industry73
are examples of this phenomenon. These studies raise questions regarding
the significance of contract law, as reflected in current appellate doctrine,
to contract relationships; only very rarely will long-term relationships
surface in appellate litigation. Collins unfortunately neglects much of
this literature. One consequence is that his examples of co-operation
and interdependence tend to be drawn from appellate cases and from
sales law. For example, the classic case of Drennan v. Star Paving,7
4
where a main contractor's reliance on a subcontractor's bid was protected
notwithstanding the absence of any contract between the parties, is hardly
a paradigm of long term interdependence. The same is true for consumer
contracts, where the parties may often have little concern for long-term
relationships (beyond market reputation). Collins's focus on appellate
doctrine means that, although his text is in many ways radical, it is limited
by the classical framework of appellate case law. The reader does not
get any real sense of the changed nature of modem markets and their
relationship to contract law.
A fascinating example of this phenomenon is provided in a highly
suggestive essay by Robert Kagan.75 Kagan found that, although, during
the period of 1940-70, there was a large growth in credit and delinquent
debts in the USA, there was also an actual decline in debt litigation
68 On transaction-specific investments see Williamson, supra, note 5.
69 Collins, supra, note 8 at 1.
70 A. Kronman, "Contract Law and the State of Nature" (1985) J.L. Econ. & Org. 5.
71 Supra, note 5.
72 Ibid; and see "Contract Analysis: The Transaction Cost Approach" in P. Burrows & C.
Veljanovski, eds, The Economic Approach to Law (London and Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) at
39.
73 Macaulay surveys his work over the past two decades in "An Empirical View of Contract"
(1985) Wise. L. Rev. 465.
74 (1958) 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P. 2d 757.
75 R.A. Kagan, "The Routinization of Debt Collection: An Essay on Social Change and Conflict
in the Courts" (1984) 18 L. Soc'y Rev. 323.
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in appellate and first instance courts. After exploring a number of potential
explanatory factors, such as legal rationalization, changes in litigation
costs, and the political activity of debtors, he suggested the growth of
"systemic stabilisation" 76 as a primary factor. This concept describes "the
development of large-scale economic and social institutions that ame-
liorate the conditions that cause individual conflicts or that provide
collective, administrative remedies (as contrasted to case-by-case legal
remedies)." These included "methods of loss spreading, diversification,
insurance, and economic stabilization ... which encourage the absorption
of losses rather than protracted litigation." 77 Examples of this phenomenon
were governmental maintenance of economic stability during this period
and the rise of large diversified lending organisations with the ability
to reschedule debts and build a certain bad debt level within their portfolios.
In addition, the widespread availability and acceptance of bankruptcy
as a type of socially provided insurance for credit breakdown was a
further factor drawing business from the courts. Kagan argues that the
development of these routinized procedures also reflected a cultural
willingness to view the default debtor as an unfortunate victim of changed
circumstances rather than a delinquent to be subjected to the rigours
of court enforcement. Credit casualties were to be permitted a speedy
re-entry to the credit market, which had clearly become a central and
generally beneficial institution in society. This seemed partly to mirror
the thesis that "as the commercial spirit advances - that is, as people
lend and borrow, trust and are trusted more - the severity of the law
for the fulfilment of these contracts diminishes. ' 78
Kagan's work draws attention to the complex relationships between
changes in markets and market organisation, the role of the state in
regulating these changes and their cumulative impact on the functioning
of the legal system. It raises questions about the role and significance
of contracts within and between bureaucracies. His description also seems
to mirror the interdependence thesis regarding the modem economy. But
whose interests are served by these developments? What values are
furthered or sacrificed? Ought we to interpret those developments towards
rationalised bureaucracy as a loss of individual freedom? And how should
we characterise the role of the state in maintaining systemic stability?
As "responsive law"79 or a Habermasian crisis management?80
76 Ibid at 352.
77 Ibid at 352 and 365.
78 Robert Lowe, quoted in G. Rubin & D. Sugerman, eds, Law, Economy and Society: Essays
in the History of English Law (Abingdon: Professional Books Ltd, 1984) at 289.
79 P. Nonet and P. Selznick, Law and Society in Transition" Towards Responsive Law (New
York: Octagon Books, 1978).
80 J. Habermas, Legitimation Cdis (London: Heinemann, 1976).
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The introduction of corporatism by Collins towards the end of the
book is intended to close the apparent conflict between a neo-conservative
vision of markets and individualism and bureaucratic regulation. This
middle way will harness the benefits of markets to further the public
interest, incorporating private actors in the implementation of regulatory
policies and avoiding the inefficiencies and threats to freedom from
imposed bureaucratic regulation. Rules are negotiated rather than im-
posed, although the state is the moving force in securing agreement.
Consensus is the underlying goal rather than the continuing conflict
implicit in the traditional pluralist model of government. The justification
for corporatism is based primarily on the limitations of the polar opposites
of markets and bureaucracy. It also provides a solvent for the conflict
between individualism and communitarianism.
When writers describe the dangers of bureaucracy, their argument
often rests on images of the impersonal Weberian official acting without
fear, favour, or passion. In recent years, deregulatory rhetoric has fuelled
criticisms of government bureaucracy.81 Much of this latter literature
seems to have influenced Coffins's critique. It is, however, necessary to
probe the assumptions concerning bureaucracy. Much of the critique is
American and must take some sense from that context.
Bureaucracy and government regulation are a relatively recent
phenomenon in the history of the USA.82 There is no long European
tradition of a state bureaucracy with a relatively high degree of respect
and authority.83 Regulatory agencies are a modem exception to the rule
of the private market, and their legitimacy is viewed by many as resting
on the extent to which they effectively mimic market conditions or correct
market failures. Agencies may act as market policemen but must be
careful not to impose their values or visions of society on market
participants. 84 The public and private realm must remain separate. For
example, the Federal Trade Commission was humbled in its attempts
to regulate unfair advertising regarding psychological claims, which
appealed to status needs or played on emotional weakness. Dubbed "The
81 R.L. Rabin, "Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective" (1986) 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189
at 1316-26.
82 See the interesting discussion of the US regulatory crisis from a German perspective in
N. Reich, "The Regulatory Crisis - Does it Exist and Can it be Solved" (1984) Govt. & Pol'y
177.
83 See G. Wilson, "Social Regulation and Explanations of Regulatory Failure" (1984) Political
Stud. 203 at 224-25.
84 See the useful comparison of the US policeman role to the broader variety of Canadian
regulatory objectives in R.D. Cairns, Rationales for Regulation Technical Report No. 2 (Ottawa:
Economic Council of Canada, 1980).
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National Nanny" by the Washington Post, in relation to its proposals
to regulate children's advertising, 5 it has retreated to the position where
unfairness is to be defined in terms of situations where rational consumers
are unlikely to be able to protect themselves against costly mistakes
in the market.86 In short, the values of the market rule.
Distrust of bureaucracy and the state is a theme in both conservative
and radical critiques in the United States.8 7 The Critical Legal Studies
movement, for example, sometimes appears committed to the values of
small-scale communities that will reflect both a personal autonomy,
reminiscent of Henry Thoreau, and the active sharing and participation
of socialism. Is this critique of bureaucracy justified? Is it likely that
contemporary society could do without bureaucracies?88 In our second-
best world, does bureaucratic regulation have advantages over corpor-
atism? There is little systematic evidence on the comparative advantages
of these styles of regulation.89 Moreover, it is difficult to draw clear lines
between the supposed imposition of control associated with bureaucratic
regulation and the softer negotiation style of corporatism. Almost all
policy making and implementation will involve interaction between public
and private groups. The information and resource constraints of bureau-
crats and the benefits of voluntary compliance conspire to make ne-
gotiation and soft law the dominant form of regulation. 0 Corporatism
draws attention therefore to an ever present phenomenon - that regulation
is a bargaining process. 91 A key question is who wins and loses (public
bureaucrats, private industry, consumers, or politicians) from this process?
Collins demonstrates an optimism that we will all benefit in terms of
efficiency, distributional concerns, and participation. Perhaps he should
have applied his views on contract to the issue of regulation. For example,
certain groups may have unequal bargaining power in this process, such
as the unorganised and the inarticulate. Government regulation may favour
the interests of small closely knit groups over large diffuse interests like
85 See R. Pertschuk, Revolt against Regulation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982)
at 69.
86 See discussion of this standard in N. Averitt, "The Meaning of 'Unfair Acts or Practices'
in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act" (1981) 70 Geo. L. J. 225.
87 0. Fiss, "Why the State?" (1987) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 781.
88 Ibid at 794.
89 Compare, for example, E. Bardach & R.A. Kagan, Going By the Book The Problem of
Regulating Unreasonableness (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982) advocating the benefits
of soft enforcement with the critique by R.L. Abel, (1984-5) 84 Mich. L. Rev. 772.
90 S. Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982)
at 118 (on standard setting).
91 See C. Veljanovski, "Regulatory Enforcement" (1983) 5 L. & Pol'y Q. 75; Law Reform
Commission of Canada Report No. 86 Relational Implantation (Ottawa, 1986).
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consumers.92 The new professionals spawned by the welfare state (for
example, alkali inspectors, consumer protection officers, et cetera,) will
have a vested interest in the continuation of particular programmes. 93
Politicians seeking re-election will have an interest in wooing marginal
voters.94
In accepting the legitimacy of such a bargaining process, a major
issue is to structure participation so that distributive outcomes will not
be skewed to favour unnecessarily any particular group. One of the
intriguing characteristics of this political bargaining process is that it
is unending.95 The implications of this for the participants involved and
the strategies involved must obviously be of interest to students of long-
term contractual relationships.
Collins's work is addressed primarily to an English audience. I have
already alluded to the dominance of a particular style of legal thought
in English contracts scholarship. The power of the traditional contracts
textbook in English legal education has been documented on many
occasions.96 At times it seems impossible to escape from the frozen
deadness of its grasp. The richness of recent contracts literature and
the impossibility of understanding contract law without thinking, at the
very least, about what it is for ought to have led to their demise. Yet
their doctrinal pseudo-purity continues to survive in an instrumental world
of bureaucratic regulation. Collins is absolutely right here; their apparent
neutrality conceals the unexpressed premises on which they are based
- freedom of contract, individualism, and so on. Doctrine masks the
values. Most texts have only been able to maintain any semblance of
coherence by relegating exceptions to different areas of law and by
downplaying vast areas of statutory regulation. Yet every year, incoming
students implicitly imbibe the ideas of freedom of contract and individual
bargaining. All other values must be defined in terms of these apparently
dominant values. There is no contingency or anxiety concerning the right
values. These points are so trite and obvious that I hesitate to repeat
them.
Yet the reception given Collins's text in 6ite English law reviews
suggests the continued vitality of black-letter appellate contract law. There
92 See A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957); D. Mueller,
Public Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and the useful discussion in MJ.
Trebilcock et al, The Choice of Governing Instrument (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1982).
93 See M. Hill & G. Bramley, Analysing Social Policy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
94 Trebilcock et at, supra, note 92 at 33.
95 Ibid at 8-10.
96 See, for example, the early work by W.L. Twining, "Is Your Textbook Really Necessary"
11 (1970) J. Soc'y of Pub. Tchrs. L. 81.
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is the assumption that any attempt to introduce 'external issues', such
as politics or economics, must be reserved for specialized courses. Thus,
one reviewer suggests that Collins's book would be helpful to the "better
third year students who have covered the groundwork of contract law
and whose general awareness needs sharpening."97 It is all perhaps too
complex for the incoming student who is still expected to digest convoluted
judgments and the obscurities of Megarry and Wade.
Modem contract scholarship is beginning to make clear Llewellyn's
argument that contract law had the modest role of "providing a framework
for well-nigh every type of group organisation and for well-nigh every
passing or permanent relationship between individuals and groups."98
Llewellyn's conflation of the law of contract with "the law of relationships"
underscores its potential significance as a key to understanding the nature
of society and law in society. Ultimately contract law fascinates because
it is a prism for thinking of our continuing dilemmas: the tensions between
individualism and community, the role of bureaucracy in modem life,
the relative merits of private markets and public control, and the
relationship between the private and public realm. The challenge for
scholars and teachers is to incorporate the necessary empirical and
theoretical material to illustrate the richness of these themes. Collins's
text provides a straightforward and provocative introduction to many
of these issues.
97 Reynolds, supra, note 19 'at 628.
98 K. Llewellyn, "What Price Contract: An Essay in Perspective" (1931) 40 Yale Li. 704
at 736-37.
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